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CIVIL PROCEDURE – RES JUDICATA 
Summary 
The Court confirmed that a lawsuit dismissed under NRCP 41(e), unless dismissed 
without prejudice, is res judicata to a future lawsuit between the same plaintiff and defendant 
involving the same claims for relief. The Court determined that the district court correctly 
dismissed Theobald’s second lawsuit based on res judicata, and clarified its previous holding in 
Home Savings Ass’n v. Aetna Casualty & Surety.2
Disposition/Outcome 
Affirmed district court’s dismissal of second lawsuit, as it was subject to res judicata. 
Factual And Procedural History 
Procedure: 
Appellant Brent G. Theobald Construction, Inc. filed a lawsuit that was dismissed by the 
district court under N.R.C.P. 41(e) for failure to prosecute, without that court’s clarification of 
whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.  A second suit by Theobald Construction 
was dismissed based upon the principle of res judicata.  Theobald cited Home Savings Ass’n v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety3 for the proposition that the second suit was not barred by res judicata. 
Facts: 
Respondent Richardson Construction, Inc., was a general contractor on a project for the 
White Pine County School District.  Richardson subcontracted with Theobald to provide labor, 
materials, equipment, and other services for the project.  The subcontract provided that “[t]he 
Final payment of retention will be paid to Subcontractor 30 days after receipt of retention from 
the Owner.”  During construction, additional costs were allegedly incurred as a result of extras, 
changes, delays, failures to provide access, and changes in the scope of the project.  As a result, 
White Pine refused to pay Richardson the final payment and retention, and Richardson refused to 
pay Theobald until White Pine paid Richardson. 
Theobald sued Richardson in April 1995 for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.  
Richardson, however, chose to arbitrate its dispute with White Pine and moved for a stay of 
litigation with Theobald while it pursued the arbitration.  The district court denied Richardson’s 
motion for a stay of litigation in March 1997. 
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Instead of pursuing its claims, Theobald cooperated with Richardson in Richardson’s 
arbitration with White Pine.  Theobald then waited for the arbitration between Richardson and 
White Pine to be resolved so that Richardson could pay Theobald.  Theobald and Richardson did 
not agree to extend the time for Theobald to bring the action to trial under NRCP 41(e).  
Richardson and White Pine settled in December 1997.  In February 2002, Theobald, now aware 
of the settlement, requested payment from Richardson, which refused to pay.  In March 2003, 
nearly eight years after it filed its complaint, Theobald moved for summary judgment against 
Richardson.  Richardson moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on NRCP 41(e) for failure to 
prosecute.  As the lawsuit had not been prosecuted within NRCP 41(e)’s five-year requirement, 
the district court dismissed the lawsuit.  The district court did not indicate whether it dismissed 
the lawsuit under NRCP 41(e) with or without prejudice. 
Theobald did not appeal or ask for modification of that order.  Instead, it filed a second 
complaint against Richardson in July 2003.  Theobald again alleged breach of contract and 
unjust enrichment.   
Discussion 
NRCP 41(e) mandates dismissal of an action five years from the date it was filed if trial 
has not commenced,4 and the district court has discretion to dismiss the case with or without 
prejudice.5  However, unless the district court states in its order that dismissal is without 
prejudice, dismissal with prejudice is presumed6 and “is res judicata and bars any other suit on 
the same claim.”7
Theobald filed its first lawsuit against Richardson in April 1995.  Theobald failed to 
prosecute the lawsuit until March 2003, eight years later, and the district court dismissed the case 
under NRCP 41(e) without mentioning prejudice.  Under NRCP 41(e), dismissal with prejudice 
must be presumed.  Theobald failed to appeal or to seek clarification of this order.8  Instead, in 
July 2003, Theobald filed its complaint in the present litigation with the same claims against the 
same defendant.  NRCP 41(e)’s express language rendered this second complaint res judicata, 
and the district court dismissed the complaint. 
The Court distinguished this case from Home Savings, upon which Theobald based its 
argument that when a case is dismissed under NRCP 41(e) and a subsequent lawsuit is filed by 
the same plaintiff against the same defendant involving the same claims, the court in the second 
case can review the NRCP 41(e) dismissal and may allow the second case to proceed if the 
NRCP 41(e) dismissal should have been granted without prejudice. 
The procedural history of Home Savings, disproves the interpretation by Theobald.  In a 
bifurcated trial, the plaintiff H.S. proceeded against the defendant Aetna while the other plaintiff 
Home Savings awaited the outcome.  H.S. prevailed at trial in October 1984 and on appeal in 
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February 1987.  Home Savings then sought summary judgment against Aetna in October 1988.9  
After Home Savings sought summary judgment against the defendant Aetna. in the first case, 
Home Savings and H.S. filed a second complaint against Aetna in November 1988 seeking the 
same declaratory relief and other damages. 
Without mentioning prejudice, the district court granted Aetna’s NRCP 41(e) motion to 
dismiss Home Savings from the first case.  Home Savings immediately appealed the district 
court’s NRCP 41(e) dismissal, which was determined to be premature because the cases had 
been consolidated and no final judgment for the combined case had been entered.  Eventually, 
the district court entered partial summary judgment against Home Savings in the second case 
based on res judicata and dismissed the case upon the parties’ stipulation for dismissal.  Home 
Savings and H.S. then appealed this final judgment, challenging the earlier NRCP 41(e) 
dismissal order. 
Therefore, both the NRCP 41(e) dismissal of Home Savings’ first complaint and the 
subsequent order finally resolving both cases were before this Court in Home Savings.  
Consequently, it had jurisdiction to consider whether the district court abused its discretion when 
it did not dismiss the first case without prejudice. 
This case has a different procedural posture.  The two district court actions were not 
consolidated.  And, Theobald did not appeal the district court’s NRCP 41(e) dismissal order in 
its first case.  Because that dismissal was not before the Court, it had no jurisdiction to consider 
whether the district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the case without prejudice. 
Conclusion 
Home Savings timely appealed the district court’s dismissal of its case under NRCP 
41(e).  Here, however, Theobald did not appeal the district court’s order dismissing, under NRCP 
41(e), its first case.  Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to consider 
whether the district court abused its discretion when it did not dismiss the first case without 
prejudice.  Thus, under NRCP 41(e), Theobald is barred from bringing the same claims against 
Richardson, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Richardson’s 
motion to dismiss.  Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order was affirmed. 
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